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Joint Investigation Teams in the Netherlands – What Lessons Can Be Learned From 
the Dutch Model? 
 




Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) are supposed to be powerful, 
modern tools in the fight against organised transnational 
crime. Their innovative character lies primarily in the fact 
that such a team is comprised of investigators from multiple 
jurisdictions, functioning as a single unit tasked with per-
forming a criminal investigation. There is a single person 
supervising the investigation, mostly a prosecutor. The inte-
grated nature of such a team is evident from the fact that 
information can be shared freely within the team, and the 
transfer of evidence is usually met with less formalities than 
in classic mutual legal assistance. 
While several international and European instruments in-
clude provisions on JITs, national law can specify certain 
issues and set additional rules. It is important to be aware of 
these when contemplating the setting up of a JIT, since na-
tional law can have quite some practical relevance. Moreo-
ver, differences in national law can be of academic interest, 
because they show diverging interpretations of what the con-
cept of a JIT entails and subsequently raise questions as to 
their design and to (judicial) oversight of these teams. In this 
article, I discuss Dutch law on JITs, which could offer helpful 
insights for practical purposes as well as some points for 
discussion on the law applicable to JITs as such. 
Below, I will first explain in paragraph II the applicable 
law in the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as in prosecu-
torial guidelines. Next, I will focus on several issues in Dutch 
law relevant for JITs. Paragraph III tackles issues of choice of 
forum, both relating to the place of investigation and the 
place of prosecution. Subsequently, paragraph IV discusses a 
particular aspect of Dutch law on JITs: the status of foreign 
law enforcement authorities in Dutch territories, as well as 
the status of Dutch authorities abroad. Following that, para-
graph V explains the law on procedural irregularities commit-
ted in a foreign jurisdiction and the difficulties in compensat-
ing for these under Dutch law. Last, paragraph VI focuses on 
the provisional exchange of evidence within a JIT, and a 
recent change in legislation relevant for that matter. 
 
II. Applicable law 
The law applicable to JITs emanates from both international 
and national legal sources. For most EU countries, the main 
sources of international law on which a JIT may be based are 
Art. 13 of the 2000 Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters between the Member States of the Europe-
an Union1, and the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Criminal Law and Criminal Proce-
dure, University of Groningen. 
1 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters be-
tween the Member States of the European Union, OJ 2000, C 
197/1. 
20022. There are of course more treaties and conventions 
which enable JITs to be established, but I will largely ignore 
international law sources in the following, and focus on na-
tional law instead. International law rules have been de-
scribed extensively elsewhere.3 What is important to note is 
that Dutch national law is of a supplementary nature to the 
rules in international instruments. The provisions in the Code 
of Criminal Procedure (CCP) and in the applicable interna-
tional instrument therefore have to be read together. 
Art. 5.2.1 CCP provides rules for the establishment of a 
JIT. Importantly, it requires a basis for a JIT in a treaty or a 
framework decision. Furthermore, the JIT should be estab-
lished for a limited period of time, and its purpose should be 
the execution of criminal investigations in common with the 
competent authorities of other countries. The public prosecu-
tor is competent to establish a JIT in a written agreement with 
the competent authorities of the participating countries, on 
the basis of a request for mutual legal assistance. The agree-
ment should at least contain provisions on the JIT’s objective, 
the period of operation, the place of establishment, the com-
position of the team and the competences of its members. 
What also should be included is the duty for the non-Dutch 
members to appear as a witness in court if and when a case is 
prosecuted before a Dutch criminal court. 
The provision that the public prosecutor is competent to 
establish a JIT could be slightly misleading. The Public Pros-
ecution Service has issued a guideline on JITs, which restricts 
the competence to establish a JIT to the College of Procura-
tors-General, the central authority within the Public Prosecu-
tion Service. This power has been partly mandated to the 
National Office of the Public Prosecution Service.4 Accord-
ing to the guideline, the public prosecutor in whose territory 
the JIT will operate should ensure in an early stage that police 
and prosecutorial capacity are sufficient to enable the JIT to 
carry out its functions. Moreover, the prosecutor should only 
seek the establishment of a JIT if a transnational investigation 
in at least two countries is necessary, if the investigation will 
be complicated, and if the offences that are investigated have 
affected at least two countries and a successful investigation 
is impossible without a JIT.5 If the prosecutor deems these 
conditions to be fulfilled, he should provide the College of 
Procurators-General or the National Office with the draft 
                                                 
2 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on joint in-
vestigation teams, OJ 2002, L 162/1. 
3 See for instance Zurkinden, Joint Investigation Teams, 
Chancen und Grenzen von gemeinsamen Ermittlungsgruppen 
in der Schweiz, Europa und den USA, 2013. 
4 Aanwijzing internationale gemeenschappelijke onder-
zoeksteams, Staatscourant 2008, nr. 45. 
5 Aanwijzing internationale gemeenschappelijke onder-
zoeksteams, Staatscourant 2008, nr. 45, paragraph 4.1. 
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agreement and, additionally, with an action plan which is the 
basis for the JIT’s activities.6 
There is some criticism relating to the emphasis on the 
need for sufficient capacity as a condition to establish a JIT. 
This is perceived to be characteristic for Dutch investigative 
practice, valuing short-term investigative actions obstructing 
criminal activities over long-term police work aimed at end-
ing a certain pattern of criminal activity or a criminal group. 
This emphasis on investigative capacity could reduce the use 
of JITs, as they are designed for longer and more thorough 
investigations. However, this does not necessarily decrease 
investigative effectiveness, since it is thought that parallel 
investigations could in practice be as effective as JITs. Also, 
the use of mutual legal assistance has been simplified, for 
instance by the introduction of the European Investigation 
Order.7 
 
III. Choice of forum 
Among the first questions to be answered when considering 
to establish a JIT are questions of forum. These can be distin-
guished between questions on where to establish the JIT and 
questions on where to start a prosecution. Regarding the 
choice for the place where the JIT should be established, and 
from where the investigation should be supervised, the Public 
Prosecution Service’s guideline gives multiple factors to take 
into account.8 The first factor is where the main focus of the 
investigation is. This could be indicated by the physical loca-
tion of the suspects or the location where the offences took 
place. The second factor is the competence to prosecute the 
suspects, in order to prevent extradition or surrender proceed-
ings. The third factor is the location of the evidence that must 
be gathered, also including the execution of investigative 
measures such as telephone tapping. The fourth and final 
factor refers to practical issues such as the availability of 
special expertise or investigative capacity. Despite the care-
fulness with which the choice for a location for the JIT is 
made, it may become necessary that its location is changed. 
The guideline refers to the possibility that the focus of the 
investigation will shift to another country, and that such a 
development may incur the need to move the supervision of 
the JIT to another country as well. 
Wherever the JIT is established, it will consist of investi-
gators from multiple countries. The first JITs were organised 
in such a fashion that all or most participating investigators 
would share offices and work together in close proximity. 
However, there is a tendency to organise JITs differently, 
consisting of investigators which remain based in their re-
spective countries and collaborate from there. This is per-
ceived to lead to a decrease in the learning experience of 
participating investigators, but an increase in efficiency.9 
                                                 
6 Aanwijzing internationale gemeenschappelijke onder-
zoeksteams, Staatscourant 2008, nr. 45, paragraph 5.2. 
7 Sollie/Kop, Joint Investigation Teams. Lessons learned, 
2012, p. 66–74, 151–152. 
8 Aanwijzing internationale gemeenschappelijke onder-
zoeksteams, Staatscourant 2008, nr. 45, paragraph 4.2. 
9 Sollie/Kop (Fn. 7), p. 95–96, 103–104. 
The CCP and the guideline do not contain any binding 
provisions on the choice of forum for instigating criminal 
proceedings after finishing the investigation by a JIT. Ac-
cording to the guideline, the forum for prosecution should 
ideally be the country in which the JIT was established and 
where the investigation took place.10 However, the guideline 
also states that in most cases it will only become clear during 
the investigative stage where prosecution could best take 
place. Because of that, the guideline instructs prosecutors to 
involve prosecutorial authorities in the participating countries 
in the work of the JIT already in an early stage of the investi-
gation. This is thought to facilitate the eventual decision on 
the forum for prosecution.11 
Apart from this, in the legislative proceedings it was sug-
gested that an intention for a forum for prosecution may be 
included in the agreement establishing a JIT.12 But other 
methods of striking a more or less binding agreement be-
tween the parties involved are also possible. In the case of the 
JIT investigating the downing of flight MH17, the participat-
ing countries have decided to prosecute all criminal cases in 
the Netherlands, for which purpose a separate treaty has been 
concluded, allowing a transfer of proceedings from Ukraine 
to the Netherlands of cases involving non-Dutch victims.13 
 
IV. Status of foreign officials 
Art. 5.2.2 CCP provides rules on the exercise of competences 
of the members of a JIT. It requires that the exercise of inves-
tigative powers in the Netherlands observes the rules of the 
CCP and of the treaties applicable between the participating 
countries. The interpretation of this provision has been the 
subject of some controversy in the first JITs operating within 
the Netherlands. The 2005 agreement setting up an experi-
mental JIT between the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands, which investigated a case of drug trafficking, con-
tained a provision directly attributing investigative compe-
tences in the Netherlands for UK law enforcement authori-
ties. In doing so, it equalled their status to that of Dutch po-
lice officers. The Ministry of Justice, which had an observing 
role in the experiment, sent a letter to the Public Prosecution 
Service objecting to this aspect of the agreement. In its view, 
Art. 5.2.2 CCP should not be interpreted as enabling a JIT 
agreement to define investigative powers, which supplement 
the powers that are defined in the CCP.14 Since that moment, 
this interpretation is viewed as correct,15 and, consequently, 
                                                 
10 Aanwijzing internationale gemeenschappelijke onder-
zoeksteams, Staatscourant 2008, nr. 45, paragraph 7.1. 
11 Aanwijzing internationale gemeenschappelijke onder-
zoeksteams, Staatscourant 2008, nr. 45, paragraph 5.1. 
12 Explanatory memorandum, Parliamentary documents II 
2001/02, 28351, 3, p. 8. 
13 Agreement between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and 
Ukraine on International Legal Cooperation regarding Crimes 
connected with the Downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 
MH17 on 17 July 2014, Staatsblad 2017, nr. 102. 
14 Rijken, Utrecht Law Review 2006, 99 (115 ff.). 
15 See also Aanwijzing internationale gemeenschappelijke 








foreign law enforcement officials have limited investigative 
competences in the Netherlands. 
However, there are some possibilities for foreign law en-
forcement officers to execute investigative powers in the 
Netherlands on the basis of existing rules, whether in treaties 
or in the CCP. A straightforward example of the first kind is 
the power of cross-border pursuit, which is included in multi-
ple treaty provisions.16 An exception of the second kind is the 
power to systematically observe a suspect, if a foreign law 
enforcement officer is specifically authorised for that purpose 
by the prosecutor.17 There are some additional rules in that 
regard, laid down in a ministerial decision, such as the obli-
gation to report and the obligation to appear as a witness in 
court if needed.18 
These exceptions are generic exceptions and not specifi-
cally designed for members of a JIT. While they can of 
course be employed in the context of a JIT, most of the inves-
tigative powers that are to be executed on Dutch territory 
must necessarily be executed by Dutch investigators. Foreign 
officers can participate in the investigation, but they have to 
be escorted by Dutch authorities, who at least formally exe-
cute any investigative powers.19 
One of the most important of these rules, and a rule in-
cluded in the CCP, is that foreign officers must be willing to 
appear in court as a witness. This rule can have the conse-
quence that participating countries make a certain selection of 
the available law enforcement officers to second to the JIT. 
Spapens suggests that foreign authorities could pick only 
those members of a large investigation team as members of a 
JIT who have enough information in order to be able to oper-
ate within the JIT, but not those members who have certain 
information that the participating country is not willing to 
disclose in court in foreign criminal proceedings.20 
Conversely, Dutch authorities in foreign JITs may only 
act within the competences Dutch law attributes to them. This 
does not restrict their actions within a foreign JIT very much, 
since Dutch law enables the extraterritorial exercise of inves-
tigative powers. However, this must remain within the scope 
made possible by international law.21 This means that, if there 
is a treaty basis for extraterritorial exercise of competences 
and the specific type of investigative act is allowed under 
Dutch provisions, Dutch officers may exercise these compe-
tences as members of a JIT. Of course, the national law of the 
                                                 
16 For example in Art. 41 of the Convention Implementing 
the Schengen Agreement and in Art. 21 of the new Treaty 
between the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Kingdom of Bel-
gium and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on police cooper-
ation, Brussels, 23 July 2018. See also Art. 54 par. 5 CCP for 
the corresponding power under national law. 
17 Art. 126g par. 9 CCP. 
18 Samenwerkingsbesluit bijzondere opsporingsbevoegdhed-
en, Staatsblad 1999, nr. 549. 
19 Spapens, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice 2011, 239 (252–253). 
20 Spapens, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice 2011, 239 (252). 
21 Art. 539a CCP. 
country where the investigative acts are carried out may very 
well pose additional restrictions.22 
 
V. Procedural irregularities 
Since investigations in the framework of a JIT are carried out 
by officers of multiple counties, questions are raised not only 
with regard to the laws applicable to their actions, but also to 
the rules for compensation or correction of procedural irregu-
larities. The main rule in Dutch criminal procedure is that 
irregularities committed in an investigation abroad do not 
have any consequences in Dutch criminal proceedings. The 
reason for this is that irregularities can only have conse-
quences for the outcome of a case when they are committed 
in “the investigation leading to the case”. Because the princi-
ple of trust governs international relations, the Supreme Court 
is of the opinion that investigative acts executed by foreign 
law enforcement authorities are not executed “in the investi-
gation leading to the case”.23 However, there are two excep-
tions to this rule. The first is that the irregularity was commit-
ted on the instigation of the Dutch Public Prosecution Ser-
vice. The second is that the irregularity violated essential 
defence rights.24 When one of these exceptions is present, the 
irregularities committed abroad may be compensated in 
Dutch criminal procedure according to normal rules govern-
ing these decisions. They may lead to a decision to declare 
the prosecution inadmissible, to exclude evidence, to mitigate 
the sentence, or to merely note the irregularity.25 
There is some discussion on how to apply this line of rea-
soning in the context of JITs. The courts seem to apply the 
Supreme Court’s case law in a strict sense. The District Court 
of Rotterdam held in a case based on the first, experimental 
JIT investigation, that “the actions of the English judicial 
authorities are not to be reviewed by the court”.26 This inter-
pretation in effect splits the investigation in two for purposes 
of judicial review. Procedural irregularities committed by 
foreign officials are not committed “in the investigation lead-
ing to the case” and could not lead to any compensatory 
measures in a Dutch trial, unless they were instigated by 
Dutch prosecutors or violated essential defence rights. This 
position is reflected in the JIT Guideline, where the Public 
Prosecution Service instructs prosecutors leading a Dutch JIT 
to ensure that evidence obtained abroad does not enter the 
case file if it is gathered in such a way that “it fundamentally 
violates Dutch criminal procedure”.27 An example of this is 
                                                 
22 Aanwijzing internationale gemeenschappelijke onder-
zoeksteams, Staatscourant 2008, nr. 45, paragraph 6.3. 
23 Supreme Court of the Netherlands 14 November 2006, 
Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2007/179. 
24 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Judgment of 5 Octobre 
2010 – Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2011/169. 
25 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Judgment of 30 March 
2004 – Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2004/376. 
26 Rotterdam District Court, Judgment of 11 August 2006 – 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AY6630, to be found on 
www.rechtspraak.nl (18.10.2018). 
27 Aanwijzing internationale gemeenschappelijke onder-
zoeksteams, Staatscourant 2008, nr. 45, paragraph 7.3. 
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the use of infiltration by civilians, which is not allowed by 
the Code of Criminal Procedure28 and is thought to seriously 
endanger the integrity of investigations. In requiring prosecu-
tors to evaluate the lawfulness of investigations, the Guide-
line offers some protection against irregularities. Judicial 
review remains limited. 
However, a different position is also possible. After all, a 
JIT entails an integrated investigation of a combined team, 
led by a single prosecutor. Consequently, all irregularities 
could be viewed to have been committed in the investigation 
leading to the case, which would render all normal rules on 
procedural irregularities applicable. This would enable the 
courts to give more protection than the current legal frame-
work does. There is of course, then, the question as to the 
standard to apply in order to evaluate the lawfulness of inves-
tigative action. The way in which JITs are designed implies 
that the territoriality principle governs investigative actions, 
which would necessitate the courts to evaluate the actions of 
JIT members abroad against the laws of that foreign jurisdic-
tion. That is possible, perhaps with the assistance of legal 
experts, but difficult. It could be a viewed as a logical conse-
quence of the integrated nature of investigations carried out 
by a JIT. 
 
VI. Provisional exchange of evidence 
The Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure simplifies the gather-
ing and exchange of evidence in the context of JITs. For 
instance, Art. 5.2.5 CCP enables the direct transmission of 
telecommunications intercepted in the Netherlands to a JIT 
that is based abroad. It includes safeguards for the protection 
of confidential information exchange between, for instance, a 
lawyer and his client. Also, it restricts the use of the transmit-
ted information to the investigation by the JIT and requires 
additional permission if the information is to be used for 
other purposes. 
On the basis of Art. 5.2.3 CCP, evidence gathered as a re-
sult of investigative acts carried out abroad by the foreign 
members of a JIT have equal evidentiary value in Dutch 
criminal procedure as evidence relating to comparable inves-
tigative acts that are carried out by Dutch investigative offic-
ers in the Netherlands. However, this evidence can never 
have a higher evidentiary value than it does have according to 
the investigator’s national law. Consequently, police reports 
of foreign JIT members are under Dutch law regarded as 
regular police reports, for which there is no minimum rule: 
they may serve as a single piece of evidence on the basis of 
which a defendant may be convicted.29 
Another specific rule relating to the exchange of evidence 
within a JIT is Art. 5.2.4 CCP, which enables the provisional 
exchange of documents, of objects, and of data. The materials 
exchanged provisionally may be used in the investigation. 
                                                 
28 Art. 126h CCP restricts infiltration to investigative officers, 
which can also be foreign officials, as long as their appoint-
ment conforms to the rules laid down in the 
Samenwerkingsbesluit bijzondere opsporingsbevoegdheden, 
Staatsblad 1999, nr. 549. 
29 Art. 344 par. 2 CCP. 
However, they cannot be used in evidence, unless they are 
permanently exchanged by regular procedures of mutual legal 
assistance. The Code has been recently amended by a bill that 
expanded the categories that can be exchanged to also include 
“data”. Previously, it was only possible to exchange objects, 
documents and physical data carriers such as CD-ROMs.30 
Final exchange of documents or pieces of evidence al-
ways required prior court leave. As a result of the same law 
amending the Code of Criminal Procedure, the law no longer 
requires court leave for all cases in which evidence is ex-
changed by way of mutual legal assistance. This for instance 
applies when a search has taken place and items have been 
seized in the presence of the defendant. Court leave in these 
cases is replaced by a complaint mechanism. This is a change 
that is not specific for JITs, but it is a general change apply-
ing to all exchange of evidence based on requests.31 
It is a bit remarkable that Dutch law requires court leave 
in some cases, and that it does not differentiate, apart from 
the rules on provisional exchange of evidence, between the 
exchange of evidence in JITs and the exchange of evidence in 
all other cases. After all, the requirement of court leave ena-
bles the court to check whether the conditions for mutual 
legal assistance, including possible grounds of refusal, as 
they are laid down in the relevant and applicable treaties, 
have been complied with. In the case of JITs, such conditions 
are largely absent since there is a free flow of information 
and requests within the JIT. When, as is the case with JIT 
investigations, the gathering of evidence does not take place 
in the execution of a request for mutual legal assistance, the 
interference of the court in the exchange of evidence seems 
superfluous.32 Perhaps the only reason to retain the procedure 
to obtain court leave is that, in doing so, the lawfulness of the 
gathering of evidence is placed under judicial review. Since a 
foreign court most likely will not review the lawfulness of 
investigative activities by which the evidence was gathered, 
there is at least some court dedicated to do that.33 If, however, 
courts would review the lawfulness of investigative activities 
carried out abroad, it would no longer be necessary to con-
duct a review prior to exchanging the evidence. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Dutch law raises some important issues for Joint Investiga-
tion Teams which are established in the Netherlands, or 
                                                 
30 Law of 7 June 2017 amending the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure and other laws in order to modernise the rules on inter-
national cooperation in criminal matters, Staatsblad 2017, 
nr. 246, entering into force on 1 July 2018. 
31 Art. 5.1.10 CCP. 
32 The courts regard the agreement establishing a JIT to be 
the legal basis underlying the exchange of evidence: Amster-
dam District Court, Judgment of 30 May 2014 – 
ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:3457, to be found at 
www.rechtspraak.nl (18.10.2018). 
33 The Amsterdam District Court (Judgment of 30 May 2014 
– ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:3457) considered that granting the 
request for exchange of evidence did not run counter “fun-








which include Dutch investigators. Establishing a JIT in the 
Netherlands is subjected to a specific procedure within the 
Public Prosecution Service. In this procedure, as well as 
during the operation of a JIT, there are important choices to 
be made on the questions of where to establish a JIT and 
where to instigate criminal proceedings when investigations 
have been concluded. A relevant issue that can be of influ-
ence on these decisions is the status of foreign JIT members 
under Dutch law, which grants them few investigative pow-
ers. 
There are very limited possibilities to compensate any 
procedural irregularities, committed by foreign JIT members, 
in the criminal procedure following a JIT investigation. This 
restrictive approach shows the strong reliance on the princi-
ple of trust in international relations, excluding judicial re-
view of the lawfulness of foreign investigative activities. It 
goes hand in hand retaining the need for court leave before an 
exchange of evidence, also when the evidence was gathered, 
as is the case with JITs, without a request for mutual legal 
assistance. 
This legal framework is evident of a reserved attitude to-
wards JITs: there is little enthusiasm to perceive the work of 
a JIT as a single investigation and to provide it with a legal 
framework that reflects the integrated nature of investiga-
tions. Such a legal framework would include a strong assimi-
lation of foreign JIT members with national ones, as well as 
rules on the exchange of evidence and the review of investi-
gative activities that appraise the integrated character of the 
work within a JIT. The lack of such a legal framework is 
perhaps a sign of puzzlement towards the concept of a JIT. 
Probably the revolutionary idea that criminal investigations 
could be a shared endeavour needs a more robust basis in the 
law of criminal procedure. Only when there is a clear legal 
framework that fully acknowledges the integrated nature of a 
JIT, while at the same time respecting fundamental princi-
ples, a JIT can truly function as a single unit investigating 
criminal offences. 
